Implications of the EU-Turkey deal

by Alexandra Reinhild Berndt

In March 2016 the European Union made a deal with Turkey to stop the immense flow of refugees and to secure Europe’s external borders. In this article I would like to focus on the deal’s implications for Turkey, the EU and the relationship between both parties. 

For Turkey, the deal offers several incentives. In terms of financial help, Turkey receives a six-billion-dollar aid package, from which 3,2 billion euro have already been transferred (Engel, 2020). The money flows into local humanitarian aid organizations and more than hundred projects (Engel, 2020). Furthermore, Turkey benefits from visa-liberalizations for Turkish citizens for the Schengen-Area and from a resumption of EU-membership negotiations (Heck and Hess, p. 45). Ankara thus profits financially as well as strategically from this deal. However, due to human rights violations and anti-democratic developments, “Turkey’s membership perspective is no longer tenable“ and Turkey is rather seen as a “major strategic ally“ (Saatçioğlu 2020, p.170). 

In order to maintain the deal, the EU was forced to make normative concessions (Saatçioğlu 2020, p.169). The is EU largely dependent on Turkey’s compliance with the deal to protect EU external borders and prevent illegal immigration. Turkey’s bargaining power is thus unprecedented (Saatçioğlu 2020, p.175). In the last years, Turkey disregarded core democratic values and violated Human rights. However, the EU made significant normative and political concessions in order to manage the crisis. The deal is thus at the cost core democratic principles (Saatçioğlu 2020, p.177).

The relation between the EU and Turkey deteriorated significantly lately. The Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has the impression that Turkey is not sufficiently supported by the European Union and thus threatened the EU by opening its borders (Braun, et al., 2020). Moreover, he claims that the EU does not comply with the deal (Kirchner, 2020). In terms of the EU’s compliance, one can say that the European Union did not comply with all the agreements, but at least, the required money has been transferred (Kirchner, 2020). Therefore, Erdoğan actually cannot claim that the EU does not financially supports Turkey.

In conclusion, the European Union made not only financial, but also normative concessions in order to maintain the deal. Erdoğan’s claims that the EU does not comply with the agreements of the deal are only partly correct, but not in financial terms as the EU paid its agreed part.

Photo by Adli Wahid on Unsplash

References

Braun, S., Bullion, C. von, Fried, N., Herrmann, B., Szymanski, M., & Balser, M. (2020, March 3). Wie Berlin über die Lage an der griechisch-türkischen Grenze denkt. Retrieved from https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fluechtlinge-erdogan-bundesregierung-1.4827988

Engel, G. (2020, March 5). EU-Türkei-Abkommen: Wer hat den Flüchtlingsdeal gebrochen? Retrieved from https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/eu-tuerkei-fluechtlingsabkommen-109.html

Heck, G., & Hess, S. (2017). Tracing the Effects of the EU-Turkey Deal. The Momentum of the Multi-layered Turkish Border Regime. Retrieved from https://movements-journal.org/issues/05.turkey/04.heck,hess–tracing-the-effects-of-the-eu-turkey-deal.html

Kirchner, T. (2020, March 6). Flüchtlinge: Tückischer Deal zwischen EU und Türkei. Retrieved from https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/tuerkei-deal-eu-1.4829688

Saatçioğlu, B. (2020). The European Union’s refugee crisis and rising functionalism in EU-Turkey relations. Turkish Studies, 21(2), 169-187.

The EU’s Troubled History With LGBT Refugees

By Lea Schiller

November 2013: the case of three African men sets a landmark ruling on the right to asylum for LGBT people. In 2011, Dutch immigration authorities had rejected their application for asylum – saying that the men could have hidden their sexuality in order to avoid prosecution. The men appealed, and the case was referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, a refugee is defined as an individual with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group”. The Court decided in favour of the three men, ruling that gay refugees from African countries where homosexuality is punishable by law were a “particular social group” according to the convention. But although the ECJ proclaimed the decision to be a binding interpretation of EU law, this recognition under the convention of 1951 was only the first step. Legally, the applicants also have to prove their sexuality, a justified fear of persecution and that the country of origin does not provide protection (Gartner 2015).

To determine whether or not an applicant would be provided protection from persecution in their home state, complete and reliable information is vital. However, many European states used to equate lack of information with lack of enforcement, and even if sufficient information on criminalisation is available, applicants are often required to turn to the authorities in the home state for protection first (Jansen & Spijkerboer, 2011). If risk of persecution was acknowledged, the discretion requirement was often applied: recommending the applicant to conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity to avoid prosecution in their home state (Jansen & Spijkerboer, 2011) – even though the risk of forced outing would still prevail.

The ECJ ruling in 2013 turned the conversation from identifying persecution to the question of credibility; the focus was now on whether or not the applicants could prove their sexuality (Jansen, 2014). In order to determine the reliability of an applicant’s claims, many states turned to psychiatrists and doctors, who often made use of the Rorschach test, in which the doctor tries to get insight into the individual’s personality by having them interpret blots of ink (European Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2017). Additionally, many caseworkers lacked understanding for the specific situation of LGBT refugees; for example in some cases, applicant’s stories were questioned on basis of lack of information on famous LGBT meeting places in Europe (FRA, 2017). And because the experiences of LGBT people are vastly different, depending on one’s background and culture, it is crucial that assessment’s of credibility are not based on Western understandings on LGBT people (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2012).

In 2018, the ECJ banned the tests on the credibility of homosexuality claims in a binding decision on a Nigerian applicant, who was rejected by Hungarian authorities after a psychological test came back as inconclusive. The court described the reliability of the tests as “limited” and stated that they were “not essential” in determining whether or not an applicant is telling the truth.

But even after this decision, cases surfaced of questionable verification methods being used in the asylum process of EU member states, such as the one of a teenager from Afghanistan, who was turned away by Austrian officials which found that neither his behaviour or his clothing were gay enough. Just a month earlier, a man from Iraq was turned away because he was acting too feminine.
Even though the European Union has taken significant steps towards implementing a universal, just system for dealing with LGBT refugees, the journey is not over yet.

Photo by Sara Rampazzo on Unsplash

References

Can you prove it? How Europe determines whether asylum-seekers are gay. (2018, September 13). The Economist. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/09/13/how-europe-determines-whether-asylum-seekers-are-gay

European Agency for Fundamental Human Rights. (2017, March). Current migration situation in the EU: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers. Retrieved from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-march-2017-monthly-migration-report-focus-lgbti_en.pdf

Gartner, L. G. (2015). (In)credi¬b¬ly queer: Se¬xua¬li¬ty-ba¬sed asyl¬um in the Eu¬ro¬pean Uni¬on. In Chase, A. (Ed.), Transatlantic perspectives on diplomacy and diversity. Humanity in Action Press.

Jansen, S. (2014, January). Credibility, or how to assess the sexual orientation of an asylum seeker? Presented at: EDAL Conference, Dublin. Retrieved from: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/default/files/aldfiles/Credibility%20of%20sexual%20orientation%2C%20%20presentation%20Sabine%20Jansen%20at%20EDAL%20conference%20Jan%202014.pdf

Jansen, S. & Spijkerboer, T. (2011). Fleeing homophobia. Retrieved from: http://frlan.org/sites/srlan/files/fileuploads/Fleeing%20Homophobia.pdf

Riegert, B. (2013, November 8). European court ruling gives gay people hope. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/european-court-ruling-gives-gay-people-hope/a-17213185

Stone, J. (2018, January 25). EU bans countries from using ‘homosexuality tests’ on asylum seekers. The Independent. Retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/gay-test-homosexuality-test-asylum-seekers-ecj-european-court-of-justice-ban-nigerian-man-f-a8177851.html

United Nations. (1951, July). Convention relating to the status of refugees. Retrieved from: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1954/04/19540422%2000-23%20AM/Ch_V_2p.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2012, October). Guidelines on international protection no. 6: Claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity within the context of article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/509136ca9.pdf