Apulia: The Strategy Behind Tourism

By André Francischetti Moreno

An 800 kilometers coastline, olive groves leading to timeless cities of unscalable heritage value, mountains, cliffs, sanctuaries, home of Virgil, shelter of three UNESCO world heritage sites and an inspiration for one of the most representative Italian songs Nel blu dipinto di blu. Apulia is the most dynamic region in Southern Italy and is precisely located in the “heel” of the Italian “boot”. In recent years, it has become a trendy destination for tourists interested in exploring more in depth a country that keeps enchanting the world with its culture, nature and history. Emphatically, both culture and tourism have been an essential and interlinked part of the shift away from a primary-based economy, representing a big asset for regional economic growth. Rather than a natural coincidence for a gifted region, however, increased tourism has been the result of several projects sponsored by the European Union and the Italian government aimed to deal with important local challenges for international markets.

The first challenge for a further tourist development was the relative remoteness of Apulia regarding the main Italian destinations’ circuits, such as Venice, Florence and Rome. The second was the presence of small and medium sized tourism enterprises with difficult representation in the global market due to a lack of resources or willingness, thus problematizing the matching between single suppliers (e.g. hotels) and smaller suppliers (e.g. Bed and Breakfasts) with international tour operators involved in the organization of travel for foreign tourists. Additionally, a lack of highlight to the treasures of the region, seasonality, lack of private investment and infrastructure problems were also key issues to solve. A myriad of important projects was designed to address these matters, nevertheless in this text we are going to focus on two of them: “Buy Puglia” and the “PiiiL Culture” plan.

Buy Puglia was a Cohesion Policy program largely funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), lasting from 2007 to 2013. Its main goal was to give visibility to local sellers in national and international markets to attract foreign buyers. Pugliapromozione, the agency responsible for implementing the project, promoted exhibitions, trade sector initiatives to expose regional products, and provided educational tours, familiarizing tour operators with tourist attractions. The heart of Apulia´s strategy focused on two pillars, these being culture and tourism. Firstly, the action was based upon promoting culture as a place-branding and tourism attractor, strengthening the idea of culture as an employment generator tool and building competitive advantage. For tourism, the rationale was based upon reducing seasonality and attracting foreign investment via tourism promotion, diversification of the offering (from romantic routes to a sports destination), restoration of key monuments, fostering and supporting employment, and stimulating a more widespread growth of tourism including in less popular areas. Additionally, the ERDF invested heavily in ports, airports and in the restructuration and linkage of cultural and environmental heritage, becoming an important regional driver of economic activity for both employment and the overall economic development of the region.

Besides, in coherence with the EU strategy “Europe 2020”, which emphasizes a European agenda for growth and jobs in the coming decade, Apulia became a model of cultural planning by implementing the “PiiiL Culture” plan. As the name suggests, it is an economic development policy based on culture which aims on achieving smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. With an investment of 400 million euros for ten years, beginning in 2017, the region government decided to focus on the “PiiiL” acronym: Product (building a cultural product of quality), Identity ( defining identity as rooted, authentic, half-caste, open and plural), Innovation (regarding both product and its shaping), Enterprise (from volunteering to a new business culture) and Work (without good employment there is no economy of culture). Also, in partnership with the Apulian Film Commission Foundation, the Regional Ministry for Tourism changed the traditional approach on the promotion of specific areas (i.e. Salento and Vale d´Itria) towards the promotion of the brand “Apulia” and “Apulia and cinema” in Italy and abroad. The “PiiiL Culture” is planned triennially and favors public-private partnerships, innovation, internationalization, valorization of urban and suburban areas, use of underused spaces and the growth/formation of the public through cultural activities.

Today, international flights land in the main airports of Puglia in Brindisi and Bari, and the official tourism website of the region offers ready-to-take itineraries and tips on things to do, where to go and events to attend. If you have any social media, you may also use the hashtag #WeAreInPuglia to discover new places and find more about the experience of other people who visited those. Abraham Lincoln once said that the best way to predict the future was to create it, and Apulia, supported by the European Union and the Italian government, is building it in a sustainable, inclusive and attractive way.

Photo by Claudia Lorusso on Unsplash

References

https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2013/wp9_mini_case_buy_puglia_en.pdf
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2013/wp9_case_study_puglia_en.pdf
https://www.viaggiareinpuglia.it/allegati/Eventi/100423_apulia__synthesis_oecd_draft_report_1275388292363.pdf
https://www.agenziapugliapromozione.it/portal/documents/10180/4141542/Communication%20plan%20Puglia%20destination%202019
PiiiL CULTURA IN PUGLIA. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.piiilculturapuglia.it/.
Your key to European statistics. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators.

A Comparison Between Right-Wing Populist Parties in Eastern and Western Europe

By Alexandra Reinhild Berndt

In Western Europe right-wing populist parties are less influential than in Eastern Europe, but their popularity is continuously rising. During the last French presidential elections in 2017, for example, Marine le Pen from the right-wing populist party FN (Front National) progressed to the second-round run-off against president Emanuel Macron (Eiermann, Mounk & Gultchin, 2017, p. 9). Why are right-wing populist parties so successful in Eastern and Western Europe?

In states like Poland and Hungary right-wing populist parties are increasingly expanding their power and seem to be more anti-democratic at least in comparison with Western European populist parties (Allen, 2017, p. 277). They violate basic democratic principles as judicial independence and freedom of the press. However, the continuous destruction of the media is not only on the agenda of Eastern European populists, but also part of the policy of Western European populist parties (Eiermann, Mounk & Gultchin, 2017, p. 7). The effectiveness of Eastern European populist parties is particularly visible as populist parties were able to promote an anti-Muslim propaganda even if these countries were almost unaffected by Muslim immigration (Kende & Krekó, 2020, p. 31). Why were populist right-wing parties as PIS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary) so successful with their anti-Muslim rhetoric? Throughout history post-communist countries experienced not only threats to their territorial integrity, but also threats to their national integrity. These insecurities concerning their sovereignty contributed to an increased fear of the loss of national identity. Since that time, populist right-wing parties were able to easily manipulate people psychologically with the help of these consolidated fears. This also explains why these parties were able to easily mobilise against minorities as the Roma or the Jews (Kende & Krekó, 2020, p. 30). The refugee crisis in 2015 was thus an ideal tool to promote an anti-Muslim propaganda even though these countries were almost unaffected by Muslim immigration. Particularly in this case the influence and power of the right-wing parties is very extreme as even in the absence of terrorism and immigrants, fears were easily fuelled by the populists. With the help of the anti-Muslim rhetoric populist right-wing parties as PIS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary) successfully secured their power in government. They effectively capitalised from the people’s historically consolidated fears (Kende & Krekó, 2020, p. 31).

In Western European countries right-wing populist parties are also on the rise. In Western Europe, their success lies amongst others in the voter’s political frustration. In the view of the electorate that turned to populist parties, traditional parties were unable to deal with current political challenges as for example immigration and European integration. The disenchanted electorate is therefore more prone to accept the radical solutions proposed by populist right-wing parties (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2007, p.1).

Interestingly, the most successful populist parties are those which effectively employ the rhetoric of democracy. Therefore, populist parties try to justify discriminatory policies with the claim to defend Western values. This rhetoric adaption plays an important role in their attempt to appear as a mainstream party (Halikiopoulou, 2018, p. 2). Part of this strategy is also the promotion of direct democracy, including the idea of a referendum, for example. In this manner, right-wing populist parties claim to promote the will of the people. The longevity of a party generally depends on the party’s success to recruit potential voters. For this reason, the talent of the party leader to persuade and socialise sympathisers represents a crucial factor. Socially disadvantaged groups generally represent an important target group (Pauwels, 2014, p. 7). However, different populist parties attract different social classes. Some right-wing parties mainly focus on the lower-class whereas others focus on the middle-class (Betz, 1993, p. 676).

Overall, right-wing populist parties differ significantly with regard to their rhetoric, target group, ideology and agenda (Halikiopoulou, 2018, p. 3). Due to their disrespect for minorities, pluralism and the rule of law, populism is essentially illiberal (Mudde, 2016, p. 28). A very important shared trait is their exclusionary agenda and their claim to fight for the will of the people (Immerzeel & Muis , 2017, p. 910). The reasons for the popularity of right-wing populist parties are slightly different in Eastern and Western European countries. In Western Europe, the popularity of right-wing populist parties lies in the voter’s political frustration whereas in Eastern Europe, right-wing populist parties are particularly successful due to their anti-Muslim rhetoric which effectively fuels historically consolidated fears.

Photo by Samantha Sophia on Unsplash

References

Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (Eds.) (2007). Twenty-first century populism: The specter of Western European democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Allen, T. J. (2017). All in the party family? Comparing far right voters in Western and Post-Communist Europe. Party Politics, 23(3), 274-285.
Betz, H. G. (1993). The two faces of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. The Review of Politics, 55(4), 663-686.
Eiermann, M., Mounk, Y., & Gultchin, L. (2017). European populism: Trends, threats and future prospects. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
Halikiopoulou, D. (2018). A right-wing populist momentum? A review of 2017 elections across Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies
Kende, A., & Krekó, P. (2020). Xenophobia, prejudice, and right-wing populism in East-Central Europe. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 29-33.
Mudde, C. (2016). Europe’s populist surge. A long time in the making. Foreign affairs, 95(6), 25-30.
Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right parties and movements in Europe. Current Sociology, 65(6), 909-930
Pauwels, T. (2014). Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherland, New York: Routledge


The EU’s Troubled History With LGBT Refugees

By Lea Schiller

November 2013: the case of three African men sets a landmark ruling on the right to asylum for LGBT people. In 2011, Dutch immigration authorities had rejected their application for asylum – saying that the men could have hidden their sexuality in order to avoid prosecution. The men appealed, and the case was referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, a refugee is defined as an individual with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group”. The Court decided in favour of the three men, ruling that gay refugees from African countries where homosexuality is punishable by law were a “particular social group” according to the convention. But although the ECJ proclaimed the decision to be a binding interpretation of EU law, this recognition under the convention of 1951 was only the first step. Legally, the applicants also have to prove their sexuality, a justified fear of persecution and that the country of origin does not provide protection (Gartner 2015).

To determine whether or not an applicant would be provided protection from persecution in their home state, complete and reliable information is vital. However, many European states used to equate lack of information with lack of enforcement, and even if sufficient information on criminalisation is available, applicants are often required to turn to the authorities in the home state for protection first (Jansen & Spijkerboer, 2011). If risk of persecution was acknowledged, the discretion requirement was often applied: recommending the applicant to conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity to avoid prosecution in their home state (Jansen & Spijkerboer, 2011) – even though the risk of forced outing would still prevail.

The ECJ ruling in 2013 turned the conversation from identifying persecution to the question of credibility; the focus was now on whether or not the applicants could prove their sexuality (Jansen, 2014). In order to determine the reliability of an applicant’s claims, many states turned to psychiatrists and doctors, who often made use of the Rorschach test, in which the doctor tries to get insight into the individual’s personality by having them interpret blots of ink (European Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2017). Additionally, many caseworkers lacked understanding for the specific situation of LGBT refugees; for example in some cases, applicant’s stories were questioned on basis of lack of information on famous LGBT meeting places in Europe (FRA, 2017). And because the experiences of LGBT people are vastly different, depending on one’s background and culture, it is crucial that assessment’s of credibility are not based on Western understandings on LGBT people (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2012).

In 2018, the ECJ banned the tests on the credibility of homosexuality claims in a binding decision on a Nigerian applicant, who was rejected by Hungarian authorities after a psychological test came back as inconclusive. The court described the reliability of the tests as “limited” and stated that they were “not essential” in determining whether or not an applicant is telling the truth.

But even after this decision, cases surfaced of questionable verification methods being used in the asylum process of EU member states, such as the one of a teenager from Afghanistan, who was turned away by Austrian officials which found that neither his behaviour or his clothing were gay enough. Just a month earlier, a man from Iraq was turned away because he was acting too feminine.
Even though the European Union has taken significant steps towards implementing a universal, just system for dealing with LGBT refugees, the journey is not over yet.

Photo by Sara Rampazzo on Unsplash

References

Can you prove it? How Europe determines whether asylum-seekers are gay. (2018, September 13). The Economist. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/09/13/how-europe-determines-whether-asylum-seekers-are-gay

European Agency for Fundamental Human Rights. (2017, March). Current migration situation in the EU: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers. Retrieved from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-march-2017-monthly-migration-report-focus-lgbti_en.pdf

Gartner, L. G. (2015). (In)credi¬b¬ly queer: Se¬xua¬li¬ty-ba¬sed asyl¬um in the Eu¬ro¬pean Uni¬on. In Chase, A. (Ed.), Transatlantic perspectives on diplomacy and diversity. Humanity in Action Press.

Jansen, S. (2014, January). Credibility, or how to assess the sexual orientation of an asylum seeker? Presented at: EDAL Conference, Dublin. Retrieved from: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/default/files/aldfiles/Credibility%20of%20sexual%20orientation%2C%20%20presentation%20Sabine%20Jansen%20at%20EDAL%20conference%20Jan%202014.pdf

Jansen, S. & Spijkerboer, T. (2011). Fleeing homophobia. Retrieved from: http://frlan.org/sites/srlan/files/fileuploads/Fleeing%20Homophobia.pdf

Riegert, B. (2013, November 8). European court ruling gives gay people hope. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/european-court-ruling-gives-gay-people-hope/a-17213185

Stone, J. (2018, January 25). EU bans countries from using ‘homosexuality tests’ on asylum seekers. The Independent. Retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/gay-test-homosexuality-test-asylum-seekers-ecj-european-court-of-justice-ban-nigerian-man-f-a8177851.html

United Nations. (1951, July). Convention relating to the status of refugees. Retrieved from: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1954/04/19540422%2000-23%20AM/Ch_V_2p.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2012, October). Guidelines on international protection no. 6: Claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity within the context of article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/509136ca9.pdf

The UK Election: A Decision on Brexit?

By Lea Schiller

The British polls opened at 8 o’clock on the morning of the 12th of December. Just 12 hours later, the first estimates gave the Conservatives an absolute majority. A few days afterwards, this result was confirmed. The United Kingdom had overwhelmingly voted in favour of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s party, granting them 365 seats out of 650. This made it the party’s biggest majority since Margaret Thatcher’s third term in 1987. Meanwhile, the Labour Party lagged behind with 203 seats, which marks their biggest defeat since 1935. They lost many of their seats in traditional Labour constituencies in the North and the Midlands, and especially among the usually Labour-based working class, where many changed their vote to Conservative.

That Friday, Prime Minister Boris Johnson gave a speech outside 10 Downing Street, saying the election results provide him with “an overwhelming mandate … to get Brexit done”. And while the distribution of seats in the Parliament certainly backs his claim, the distribution of votes tells another story entirely. In total, all parties who openly campaigned in favour of leaving the European Union combined only gained 47% of the votes while attaining 56% of seats. The Conservatives alone are right now in a position to go through with Brexit – but this is largely due to Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system, in which only one Member of Parliament represents each area and therefore causes the votes for the other candidates to be irrelevant.

Meanwhile in Brussels, the results have been met with mixed feelings. Regret over the UK’s decision to leave is still prevailing, but as the President of the European Council expressed, the decisive vote promises clarity that is important for the next round of Brexit negotiations. Because even though Johnson is preparing to ratify the Brexit deal in January, this would only end the UK’s EU membership – and the more complicated step of negotiating a future trade deal still awaits. Johnson has promised to deliver this by the end of 2020, but in Brussels, few believe this is possible (Adler, 2019), even if the Prime Minister sticks to the Free Trade Agreement the EU is currently preparing to offer. And since this deal hinges on the UK agreeing to keep EU regulations, there are doubts on whether Johnson will consider this to be a good offer. For now, the direction the new government in London will choose is unclear.

And there is one other noteworthy outcome of this vote: in Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) gained 13 seats, granting them 48 of Scotland’s 59 seats. In 2016, Scotland voted in favour of remaining in the EU – ever since then, tensions have been rising between Edinburgh and London. SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon described a possible independence referendum as having been “very much at the heart of the SNP’s campaign”, and after their success in the election, she believes she has the mandate to offer people a choice. Another independence referendum for Scotland might therefore be on the way.

Looking forward, Boris Johnson has set December of 2020 to finish all trade negotiations with the EU. If he cannot make this deadline, he will have to ask for another delay in the summer. And as long as no trade deal has been signed, Britain will remain in a transition state, in which it will still have adhere to EU law, even if by then it has legally terminated its membership. So even though the election has given the Conservatives a comfortable majority, complications and uncertainties are not yet out of the way and the Prime Minister will have to work to deliver Brexit in the time he promised to his voters.

Photo by Habib Ayoade on Unsplash

Resources

After election victory, Boris Johnson says ‘We are going to unite’. (2019, December 13). The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/world/europe/uk-election-brexit.html

Adler, K. (2019, December 13). UK general election: EU prepares for Brexit hardball. BBC News.Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50777995

UK results: Conservatives win majority (2019, December). BBC News. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2019/results/england

Curtice, J. (2019, December 13). General election 2019: What’s behind the Conservative victory? BBC News. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019-50774061

Watch Johnson’s first full speech as returning Prime Minister (2019, December 13). CNN. Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2019/12/13/boris-johnson-full-speech-downing-street-intl-ldn-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/brexit-uk-politics-news/

Terrorism on the Front Cover

Is Media the Oxygen of Terrorism or a Societal Resource of Defense?

By André Francischetti Moreno

Vulnerability, despair, and not knowing from whom to run, where to go or what to do. On the 9th of November 2019, these feelings were felt once again in Europe, when 2 people died and 3 were wounded after a stabbing in the heart of London, described by the Scotland Yard as terrorism. The attacker was Usman Khan, 28, who was released from jail in December 2018, five years after he had been convicted for planning an attack on the London Stock Exchange and pubs in Stoke and setting up a jihadist training camp in Pakistan (“London Bridge,” 2019). Emphatically, this new and complex form of terrorism enacted by individual cells is being broadly recurrent in the past decade, and its motivations go much beyond George W. Bush´s explanation that terrorists are driven by their jealousy of the Western freedom. In this reflection, we are not going to cover the transnational networks and new technologies that facilitate the recruiting of individual cells by the so-called terrorist groups. Instead, we will go through the very motivations that guide these groups in order to better understand why the media coverage of terrorist attacks may paradoxically both underpin them and contribute to protecting society.

Above all, the perpetuators of terrorism are generally political actors who promote their own political agenda and are confronted with blocked institutions in their home states (e.g. censorship), which prevent them of performing changes. Following the ideas of Keck and Sikkink (1998), this phenomenon lead to the “Boomerang Effect”, in which these actors can bypass blocked institutions, and directly connect with transnational networks. Local political entrepreneurs frame their cause, build up organizational structures that command political loyalties and mobilize resources. Particularly, the attacks we have been talking about are located as one type of the possible resources of political contention (Adamson, 2005), and do not have as their main objective the killing of a great amount of people, but media coverage. The media coverage of an issue provides a space for moderate organizations to argue a distinction between the legitimacy of the cause and the tactics used to shed a light on them, thus increasing the public pressure on national governments to solve the respective problems claimed by the groups.

On the 22nd of July 2011, a home-grown right-wing extremist with an anti-Islamic and anti-immigration agenda killed 69 people, mostly teenagers on the island of Utøya, in Norway. Two hours earlier, the main governmental office complex in Oslo was attacked with an aftermath of eight deaths (Bivand & Strømsø, 2018). The Norwegian media coverage featured a constant flow of detailed interviews with survivors and family members of the victims. According to Schultz et al. (2014), “During the weekend after the terrorist attacks, respondents reported spending an extensive amount of time watching the news: a mean total of 17 hours in Oslo, and 16 elsewhere in Norway.” The news media coverage gave the perpetrator and his political messages publicity and hindered the victims by exposing them.

On the other hand, the media coverage of terrorist attacks is not only a matter of transparency, a fundamental tenet of democracy, but also a forum in which the civil society can gather information on the current level of alert in their communities, safety procedures and security norms. Furthermore, by dramatizing the event and deepening the understanding of the tactics used by the political actor in question, civil society is able and motivated to pursue policies against recruitment, dismantle transnational networks of terror, increase solidarity and avoid similarly dimensioned attacks in the future. 

Briefly, one can see that the actions of terrorist entities, pivots of a recurring theme of European security, do not end at the act of attempting against life or sovereignty of a country. Nevertheless, it goes on and uses the freedom of speech, a basis of modern democratic states, in order to further its effects and achieve its political objectives. In conclusion, an important meta-analysis remains for the media agencies and another for the public. First, to what extent should communication means echo terrorist attacks and what is their responsibility towards society? The latter, is some sort of regulation on coverage content necessary, or would it undermine the structures of a healthy democracy?

References

Adamson, F. (2005). Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18(1), 31-49.

Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn M.A. (2019, September 30). Remembering Terrorism: The Case of Norway. Retrieved from https://icct.nl/publication/remembering-terrorism-the-case-of-norway/.

Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

London Bridge: What we know about the attack. (2019, December 3). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-50594810.

Bivand M.E., & Strømsø, M. (2018). Interrogating boundaries of the everyday nation through first impressions: experiences of young people in NorwaySocial & Cultural Geography 0:0, pages 1-22.

Schultz, J.-H., Langballe, A., & Raundalen, M. (2014, July 2). Explaining the unexplainable: designing a national strategy on classroom communication concerning the 22 July terror attack in Norway. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4082195/.

Lieber Sandmann

Mass Media and the Construction of a New National Identity in Eastern Germany

By André Francischetti Moreno

“Sandman, dear Sandman, it’s not over yet; we’ll first see the evening regards; before every child must go to bed; you certainly still have time!”

If you come from Germany, or at least lived there, you have probably listened to this song from the children´s cartoon Unser Sandmännchen while you were growing up. In fact, in despite of the apparently naïve lyrics of the opening song, the cartoon´s origins relate to a not so-long time ago when Germany was still divided in two, during most part of the Cold War.  What most people do not pay attention, however, is on how the then government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) used the cartoon to build a new national identity. Indeed, national identity is not an inherent feature of human beings, rather it is something that must be constructed and disseminated. Smith (1988) goes further and argues that the concept itself can be regarded as a “political myth” as it holds that mankind is naturally divided into different nations. In 1949, the foundation of the GDR disrupted more than 78 years of German identity-building and set an important challenge to the new administration: “How to locate the newly formed East German State in the present, past and future of the common German experience” (Nothnagle, 1993, p. 93). The Unser Sandmännchen cartoon is a substantial example of how the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) used mass media to create a new national identity through the redefinition of values and historical aspects of the German society, differentiation and use of national symbols.

Firstly, Unser Sandmännchen conveyed a very important tenet of SED, which was the redefinition of the historical Heimat. The concept of Heimat, explored by Becker and Applegate (1992), denotes a homeland. It involves values and history, and thus may be used to legitimize a state, leading to a greater appreciation of the surroundings and a genuine and democratic patriotism (Palmowski, 2004, p. 369, 377). Essentially, the socialist Heimat was determined by class relations and proposed that socialism was the only way to become a fair society. (Schwarz, 1956). Emphatically, Peter Blümel, the former director of Unser Sandmänchenn, stated that the cartoon was projected to “reflect life in east Germany, transmit class consciousness and feeling of solidarity” (Molen, 2015). Moreover, historical approximation was also involved in the cartoon, endorsed by the “German-Soviet friendship myth” (Nothnagle, 1993, p. 103). The appearance of socialist symbols and, more subtly, Sandmann´s favorite place to spend holidays, Moscow, are examples of this shift. Volker Petzold, a Sandmann historian, said that it was made by and should convey a communist belief in a better and more just world, whose model was the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the government quickly recognized the political potential of the socialist Heimat and used it to differentiate the principles and policies of the new Eastern German State. Above all, the government utilized it to induce pride in the GDR’s achievements vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Germany (Poiger, 2000). Unser Sandmännchen clearly represented the attempt of policy differentiation, when the little puppet traveled to Vietnam, in the middle of the Vietnam war, and to young nation-states in Africa and the Near East spreading the values of socialism (War´s, 2019). Furthermore, Sandman, who sometimes used a spaceship, traveled to space both fictionally and in real life (when in 1978, during the Space Race, the East-German astronaut, Sigmund Jähn took a puppet with him to the Soviet space station).

Thirdly, symbols were also used in order to construct a new national identity. As it comes to the transition from the old Germany to the GDR, the Eastern leaders agreed on five official ideological phases of the GDR development, of which one was the era of “Socialist Construction”, from 1952 to 1989 (Von Buxhoeveden, 1980). According to KolstØ (2006), national identity must be learnt, and audiovisual aids such as flags, coats of arms and national anthems play a crucial role in nation building and nation-maintenance). This can be seen when Sandmann and young pioneers board on a type of plane and fly over a Berlin full of GDR flags.

In brief, one can see that the GDR government used mass media to construct a new national identity in Eastern Germany and that the cartoon Unser Sandmännchen was an outstanding example of it. First, SED was able to reach its goals through the redefinition of values and historical aspects of the German society by creating the socialist Heimat and nearing German and Soviet history. Second, it differentiated its policies by exhibiting its achievements and political engagement. Third, national symbols such as the national flag were present to consolidate a national feeling. As one can see, “Communication is (understood as) the means through which a nation forges a common identity, a common purpose, and a common resolve, and mass media are the forum in which this communication occurs” (Grossberg, Wartella & Whitney, 1998). Luckily, from now on you will have a much broader idea over the cartoon, and more ideas to frame your dreams.

Photo by Barbara Evening on Pixabay

References

Becker, C. A., & Applegate, C. (1992). A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat. The German Quarterly, 65(1), 55. doi: 10.2307/406805

Grossberg, L., Wartella, E., & Whitney, D. C. (1998). MediaMaking: Mass Media in a Popular Culture. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kolst⊘, P. (2006). National symbols as signs of unity and division. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(4), 676–701. doi: 10.1080/01419870600665409

Molen, A. (2015, September 8). Documentary: The lost world of communism part 1/3 (East Germany) [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=znb_X48WXUg

 Nothnagle, A. (1993). From Buchenwald to Bismarck: Historical Myth-Building in the German Democratic Republic, 1945–1989. Central European History, 26(1), 91–113. doi: 10.1017/s000893890001997x

Palmowski, J. (2004). Building an East German Nation: The Construction of a Socialist Heimat, 1945–1961. Central European History, 37(3), 365–399. doi: 10.1163/1569161041445661

Poiger, U. G. (2000). Jazz, Rock, and RebelsCold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany. doi: 10.1525/california/9780520211384.001.0001

Schwarz, S. (1956). Die Liebe zur Heimat: Ein wesentliches ziel unserer patriotischen erziehung (Doctoral dissertation). Berlin, Germany: Humboldt University.

Smith, A. D. (1988). The myth of the ‘modern nation’ and the myths of nations. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 11(1), 1–26. doi: 10.1080/01419870.1988.9993586

Von Buxhoeveden, C. (1980). Geschichtswissenschaft und politik in der DDR: Das problem der periodisierung. Cologne, Germany.

War´s, D. (2019, October 18). Fernsehen in der DDR: Sandmann, propaganda und ein kessel Buntes [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTpRRm2cxm0

The EU's struggles to end Daylight Saving Time (and why they are so hard to solve)

By Lea Schiller

When daylight saving time was first introduced during the First World War, the goal was to maximise the use of summer daylight and conserve fuel. By moving sundown to an hour later in the day, it was possible to sustain daily routine while burning less fuel for light. First introduced in Germany, the scarcity of wartime helped it spread throughout Europe to the United States. Though abandoned after peace was established, some European countries picked up the practice again during the oil crisis of the 1970s. In 1996, the European Union adopted legislation that requires member states to conduct clock changes in March and October of every year to keep differing time zones from destabilising the single market.

In September 2018, after conducting an online public consultation on the clock change in the European Union, the European Commission decided on the goal of ending the seasonal time changes in 2019. With about 4.6 million respondents, this consultation ended up generating the highest number of responses ever received in any public survey of the European Commission, though most of the votes originated from Germany and Austria. 84% of those who voted decided in favour of abolishing the seasonal time changes, with over 70% of all voters reporting they had a “Very negative” to “Negative” experience with the clock change – only 10% of described their experience to be “Very Positive”. The seasonal time change has been associated with causing short-term jet lag, similar to the experience after travelling through different time zones. This disruption of the biorhythm not only causes sleep disturbances and mood swings in the short run, but increases the risk of developing chronic illnesses like diabetes (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).

By the end of March, the European Parliament had voted in favour of discontinuing the time changes, leaving the governments of the individual member states to decide whether to stay in daylight saving time or maintain standard time. Naturally, the need for a coordinated approach was evident, as a patchwork of timezones could have disastrous consequences for Europe’s closely knit transportation and communication systems – not to speak of the active cross-border trade. Especially for neighbouring countries, differing time zones could cause massive complications to the schedule of international trains and cross-continent flights. The Parliament amended its proposal, stressing the importance of coordination and long-time certainty in this operation. But this certainty appears to be waining. Most countries face domestic disputes over which time to keep, or are instead in conflict with their neighbouring states, trying to cooperate in order to avoid a patchwork of timezones. Meanwhile, Britain is wondering whether EU law will even apply to them by the time the discontinuation comes into force (O’Hare, 2019). Just a month after the Parliament’s decision, the General Secretariat of the Council (2019) published a note saying they had only received positions on the time change from a small amount of member states:

“It appears that most Member States need more time to conclude relevant national inter-ministerial and stakeholder/citizen consultations, as well as consultations with neighbouring countries before finalising their position.”For now, the EU has abandoned its goal of abolishing the seasonal time changes by the end of this year. The new goal is set for 2021 – as long as all member states submit a plan on how to deal with the consequences by the end of October 2020.

Photo by Bryce Barker on Unsplash

Resources

Deutscher Bundestag (2016). Studien zu gesundheitlichen Folgen der jährlichen                                                Zeitumstellung auf die Sommerzeit. Retrieved from: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/                         blob/407624/d1fa2b547812da531f580ce77f348b4f/wd-9-044-14-pdf-data.pdf

Council of the European Union (2019, May 27). Retrieved from: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/                  doc/document/ST-9414-2019-INIT/en/pdf

European Commission. Seasonal clock change in the EU. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/                          transport/themes/summertime_en

European Commission (2018, August 31). Summertime Consultation: 84% want Europe to stop                                   changing the clock. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/summertime/                        news/2018-08-31-consultation-outcome_en

European Parliament (2019, February 15). Retrieved from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/                   document/TA-8-2019-0225_EN.pdf?redirect

Es ist Winterzeit – Wissenschaftler gibt Tipps gegen die Müdigkeit (2019, October 26). Welt.                                Retrieved from: https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article202237376/Zeitumstellung-2019-                        Es-ist-Winterzeit-Wissenschaftler-gibt-Tipps-gegen-Muedigkeit.html

O’Hare, M. (2019, October 25). Europe will change its clocks for the last time in 2021. Should                          Britain bother? The Independent. Retrieved from: https://www.zeit.de/politik/2019-10/                        winterzeit-zeitumstellung-eu-kommission-jean-claude-juncker

Schaverien, A. (2019, March 27). EU votes to end mandatory switch to daylight saving time. The                     New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/europe/                                 daylight-savings-time-european-union.html

Winterzeit: Zur Abschaffung der Zeitumstellung fehlt der EU die Einheit (2019, October 25). Zeit                    Online. Retrieved from: https://www.zeit.de/politik/2019-10/winterzeit-zeitumstellung-eu-             kommission-jean-claude-juncker

Twenty Years After the Belfast Agreement

A Historical Review on the Troubles and Brexit Implication to Northern-Ireland’s Future

By André Francischetti Moreno

“I’ve seen cruelty and injustice at first hand; so, then one fateful morning I shook bold freedom’s hand; for right or wrong I’d try to free my land”

This excerpt, taken from The Wolfe Tones’ song Joe McDonnell, refers to a terrible period of British history. The Troubles were a conflict of great violence in Northern Ireland, in which an ethno-nationalist catholic minority fought against the British Army for civil rights and unification with the Republic of Ireland. However, the Irish nationalist feeling refers to the island’s cultural renaissance, in the beginning of the twentieth century. Conflicts between Catholics and the Protestant population of Ulster date back to 1916, peace has prevailed for several decades in Northern Ireland, established after Ireland’s independence recognition in 1922. However, 1960s economic decline and marginalisation of the Catholic minority revived old tensions. Furthermore, civil rights agitation from 1968 brought a violent response from the state and loyalists, culminating in severe rioting in August 1969. 

This spiral into violence caused the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the deployment of British troops to the region. On 30 January 1972, 14 civil rights protestors were killed by the British Army in Derry on a day that became known as ‘Bloody Sunday.’ It was not until 1994 that paramilitary ceasefires in Northern Ireland, and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998, put an end in a violence wave which caused 3,500 deaths, of which 52% were civilians.

In 2016, after the UK voted to leave the European Union, new concerns arose as a non-deal Brexit would result in  a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, an EU member state. This meant limited and physically controlled crossing points. In order to avoid this outcome, in 2018, the then British Prime Minister Theresa May, proposed the Northern Ireland Protocol, also known as the Irish backsto). The protocol would keep the United Kingdom in the European Union Customs Union and Northern Ireland partially linked to the European Single Market, until a better solution was found. The Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) opposed this provision, as it believes that it undermines the integrity of the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Not surprisingly, the backstop was rejected three times by the Parliament and the inability of Mrs. May to conduct Brexit led to her resignation. 

This week, the European Union approved a new draft proposed by the British PM, Boris. Johnson. The main difference with previous proposals is that instead of having customs checks at the land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, there would be checks in the UK itself, at ports along the Irish Sea and airports. In other words, products shipped to Northern Ireland, which are suspected to be furthered to Ireland would be taxed (VAT figures as the main consumption tax). In the case they are not effectively furthered, merchants would be indemnified. The next step to formalise this deal is the approval of the British Parliament. Nevertheless, DUP leader Arlene Foster and deputy Nigel Dodds put out a joint statement laying out their concerns with the deal terms, “As things stand, we could not support what is being suggested on customs and consent issues and there is a lack of clarity on VAT.” Moreover, DUP said: “These proposals are not, in our view, beneficial to the economic well-being of Northern Ireland and they undermine the integrity of the Union.”

What happens if the Parliament rejects the deal? According to the Ben Act, Mr. Johnson, who currently holds the minority in the Parliament, would have to request a three-month Brexit delay, unless he can get MPs to approve a no-deal exit by 19th October. While the EU Council President, Donald Tusk, does not rule out an extension, EU Commission President, Mr. Juncker, is more resistant. The British PM repeatedly stated that the UK must and will leave the European Union by the 31st of October, and appealed, “Now is the moment for us to get Brexit done and then together work on building our future partnership, which I think can be incredibly positive both for the UK and for the EU.” 

Twenty years after the entry into force of the Good Friday Agreement, another deal could define the future of Belfast and its relations with London. Now, it is up to the British Parliament and EU leaders not only to issue a careful decision, but to promote a peaceful and smooth transition to the more than 1.8 million Northern-Irish people who do not want a hard border on their island.

Photo by Frederick Tubiermont on Unsplash

Resources

1966 and all that: the 50th anniversary commemorations. (2013, April 17). Retrieved from https://www.historyireland.com/20th-century-contemporary-history/1966-and-all-that-the-50th-anniversary-commemorations/.

Brexit deal: What does it mean? (2019, October 17). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50084090.

Brexit: EU and UK reach deal but DUP refuses support. (2019, October 17). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50079385.

Campbell, J. (2019, January 23). No-deal Brexit ‘means hard border’ – European Commission. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46961982.

Daly, P. (2019, October 17). Brexit: DUP’s concerns with Boris Johnson’s deal – customs, consent and VAT. Retrieved from https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/brexit-dups-concerns-with-boris-johnsons-deal-customs-consent-and-vat-38604045.html.

History of The Northern Ireland Conflict. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.history.co.uk/history-of-the-northern-ireland-conflict.

Weaver, M. (2019, October 17). DUP says it cannot support Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/17/dup-boris-johnson-brexit-deal.

“We do not need to fight for a European identity”

By Antonia Schräder

“Bringing Europe back to the People” this is what the Europeans People Party is campaigning for. This is a big promise considering the growing EU scepticism and the ever widening gap between Brussels and the Europeans. The young Europeans play an important part, they are the future. But how will the EU manage to reach out them, to make them go vote, to make them feel that there vote matters? In an interview with Dirk Gotink, Spokesperson of Manfred Weber, I tried to understand the roots of the missing European identity, which is crucial not only for the upcoming elections, but for the future of Europe.

Manfred Weber is familiar with elections on both levels, on the national and the EU level. In what way is this different for a politician ?

Interesting to see is that actually the method is the same. You want to reach your candidate and you have your ideas and your programmes how you can directly reach people. There is not a Spanish way of doing that or a German way of doing that. I mean it is basically the same. Also the concerns of people are very similar.

A major point in both, the Maastricht treaty and the treaty Amsterdam is the endeavour to create a common European identity. But we still see a cleavage between national identity and a European identity. I was wondering how to overcome this cleavage and to follow what actually binds us together as European citizen?

Well the starting point is not the European identity. The starting point is first of all to consider that people have several layers of identity, loyalty and being part of community. The first one is of course local and regional, then you have the national one and there is a European one. What the extremist try to do is that they try to oppose this to each other. This perspective is a mistake, because they belong to each other and in many places it is totally normal. Take for example someone from Castilla la Mancha in Spain, they are proud to come from the region la Mancha, they are proud to be Spanish and are a proud European. Basically we do not need to fight for a European identity, but rather we have to take into account that those different layers of identity belong together. We shouldn’t allow extremist make contractions between them. Between regional and national and European one. That is nonsense.

Even though we have these different layers of identity, which may not contradict each other, we still see that there is a lack of identity at the European level and that the national identity is still much stronger. In his campaign Manfred weber is mentioning that he will give europe back to the people. How will Mr.Weber, as the future president of the commission redeem this promise to the European citizens?

Two things are here necessary. First, in the decision making process: taking another step in the decision making process, so that the level of prioritisation, is one step closer to the people and one step further away from the the technocrats. This is not easy, because the machine is obviously very big, but the most important message for the elections is, that we have to show the people, that how they vote and what they vote has an direct impact on what happens afterwards. Basically this is the simple process of democracy. Second, in the visibility: topics such as migration, economy and climate are most import ant to europeans. These three topics you will find everywhere in Europe. People are worried about Europe not controlling the external borders. Obviously it changes from one country to another, but almost in every country it is on the top concerns. Further people are concerned about a stable economy. Priorities in our program are to give young people a perspective to a job, and give young families access to housing.We need to make sure that not an entire generation will gonna grow up indebted and that the houses the bought once, will never be sold for the same price again. We saw this in Ireland. And then the climate. Which is basically this big categorical imperative. So bringing that decision making or the topics much closer to the concerns of the people.

How is it possible to achieve this? Currently European citizens see an ineffective commission and a slow decision making process in Brussels?

I don’t agree. I think the commission has done a lot in the last 5 years. The problem is that the last 5 years were really crisis management years. Just like the 5 years before. So we’ve been already in ten years of crisis management. Which means you can not really set up a positive programme, you always have to react to the realities and the political problems of the day. Essentially, what we need to do now is have a new start.We need to present a positive agenda again. That can also lead to quick decision making. Take for example the FRONTEX decision of stocking up extra border personnel to 10.000. The council agreed to the proposal to have this full capacity by 2027. This is 12 years after the start of the migration crisis. That is not good enough, so yes: we have to deliver quicker and of course this brings some big challenges like you also have on national or local level. We analyse the problem together and then we propose a solution. Between the two steps there is some kind of a link. Important is that people have to see this link, people have to see that their concerns bout the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016 and their experiences in that period have a direct effect on the decision making of the commission in the same mandate. And exclude that we already have managed a lot, but at the moment the migration files are stuck and that will be the top priority for the next commission, which is up to Mr. Weber to solve that.

Coming back to the quote from the campaign: giving Europe back to the people. As a student who has the chance to study in another european country and who benefits from various university programmes funded by the EU, it is easier to see what impact the EU has on my personal life. The ‘Standard Eurobarometer 89 Spring 2018’ on European citizenship show that a higher level of education represents an increased level in European identity, trust in the EU and higher voting rates. The EPP campaigns for reaching out to all people. In the past we have not seen this to a great extent. How will Mr. Reach out to those young people who are not going to university? What will the Commission do for the lower middle class?

First of all we need to make EU funds and exchange programmes also accessible to lower levels of education and we have done that with Erasmus. Those funds have been increased. Further Mr. Weber has introduced an INTERAIL ticket, to give 18 year olds the chance to discover the countries around them. Also those kind of programmes need to be accessible, not only to university students, because we know that university students, they normally will take care of themselves. But surely its important. So we need to open up those funds to lower levels of education, for example when you consider the technical professions. This is what we mean by giving Europe back to the people and this is indeed not just an elite project in Brussels of high educated, super flexible cosmopolitans, speaking 6 languages. It is really something that people get picture of Europe as taking their concerns into account and moreover that Europe is actually protecting them in a globalised world. This would be my best answer to the populist and all the extremist who are attacking Europe. That we deliver, that the EU is the only mechanism we have. To built on the success we already achieved in the last 60 years.

Unfortunately, we have not seen Manfred Weber at the Maastricht debate, which was an important debate for many europeans, especially young europeans. Will we see Manfred weber in another high profile debate before elections ?

He would have loved to be there, but in this case it was just not possible. Yes of course. There will be a very big debate on the 15th of may in the European Parliament. We will be there. And there will be a debate on German television between Timmermans and Weber on the 16th of may. ARD and ZDF respectively. He would have loved to be there, but in this case it was just not possible.

Women in EU politics: What the Elections may Bring for Gender Parity in the EU

By Emma Myhre

2019 sets the one hundred year mark since several EU countries gave women the right to vote in national elections. Yet, women are underrepresented in political decision-making at local, national and European levels (1). Achieving gender parity in representative politics is arguably needed not only to uphold social justice and women’s rights, but as an important condition of effective democracy and good governance that strengthens and enhances the democratic system. This article will take a look at women in EU politics in light of the European elections, and discuss what the upcoming elections may mean for women’s issues in EU decision-making.

Since the first directly elected legislature in 1979, the percentage of women has risen after each election up to 35.8% after the 2014 election. This is above the world average for national parliaments and above the EU average for national parliaments (2). No EU-wide data exists on political representation of different groups of women, such as women from ethnic minorities, LGBTQ women, older or younger women, or women with disabilities, but the data available suggest that these groups are underrepresented (3). In other words, women are relatively well represented in the EU compared to the rest of the world, but there is still be a way to go. Additionally, the progress already made demands subtle interpretation, as it is sometimes hard to see tangibly what the EU does for women.

That being said, gender equality and the fight against discrimination is a core part of the EU’s treaties. Furthermore, the European Parliament continues to show commitment to the cause – for example, it has recently approved several resolutions regarding gender equality. These include the prevention of and fight to counter harassment in the workplace, in the public domain and in the EU political sphere (as of 11th September 2018), and on male-female parity, calling for measures to guarantee gender equality and improvement in the institutions (as of 15th of January 2019). (4)

The institutional renewal which will follow the European elections on 23rd-26th May, the formation of the new Commission and the appointment of new presidents at the European Council and the European Central Bank represent an opportunity and a risk. While it is true that recent political decisions have resulted in modest advancements in regards to gender equality, it is no less possible that these developments can be reversed (5). Worth pointing out is that the political climate in the bloc is increasingly polarized. Euroscepticism and populism will likely hold a significant role. Furthermore, the cleavage between member states and Brussels when it comes to the future of the European project continues to put pressure on the union as a whole (6). The upcoming elections will hence put the courage of European leaders to the test. A more diverse parliament would possibly disrupt the status quo. Yet it is an opportunity to enable Europe to remain, as well as advance, its position as a globally unchallenged promoter of gender equality. The EU’s advocacy for human rights will not stand as strong if women’s rights are not guaranteed.